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Zofchak: Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court Adopts the Thresh

CASE COMMENTS

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT ADOPTS THE THRESHOLD
OF CLARITY STANDARD FOR AMBIGUOUS
REQUESTS FOR COUNSEL
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994)
Linda Zofchak "*

Petitioner, a member of the United States Navy, was charged with
murder.' Petitioner initially waived his right to remain silent and his right
to counsel, both orally and in writing, when he was interviewed by Naval
Investigative Service (NIS) agents in connection with the murder.2 After
answering the agents' questions for approximately one-and-a-half hours,
petitioner said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."3 The agents stopped
questioning petitioner about the killing, but continued to ask him questions
to clarify his statement about a lawyer.4 After taking a short break, the
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment Award for Fall 1994.
** This comment is dedicated to my parents, Jim and Carol Zofchak, in recognition of their
continuing love and support.
1. See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2352-53 (1994).
2. Id. at 2353. As required by military law, the NIS agents advised petitioner that he was a
suspect in the killing, that he did not have to make any statement, that any statement he did make
could be used against him in a trial by court martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorneyand have an attorney present during questioning. Id. (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice art.
31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1988)).
3. Id.
4. Id. The contents and circumstances surrounding this exchange were disputed at trial. United
States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 339-40 (C.M.A. 1993). The agent testified that the interview proceeded
as follows:
"[We] made it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he wants a lawyer,
then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we weren't going to pursue the
matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment
about a lawyer, and he said, 'No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on,
and said 'No, I don't want a lawyer,' and then he said he didn't kill the guy and he said
that he was the type of person that if he did kill the guy, he'd have to tell someone about
it."
Id. at 340. Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that the exchange occurred as follows: "Well, they
were talking to me, and I said, 'Well, I'd like a lawyer,' and they said, 'We'll take a break,' and they
walked out and left me handcuffed to the chair, and an older guy came in and stood by the door
watching me." Id. Petitioner testified that after the break, "They came back in and started questioning
me again." Id.
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agents reminded petitioner of his rights and continued to question him
about the killing.' Approximately one hour later, the agents ceased questioning permanently when petitioner said, "I think I want a lawyer before I
say anything else."'6 A military judge denied petitioner's motion to suppress statements made at the interview,7 holding that his initial mention of
a lawyer during the interrogation was not a request for counsel Petitioner
was convicted of unpremeditated murder by a general court martial.9 The
Navy Marine Corps Court of Military Review affirmed."
Affirming the trial court's opinion, the Court of Military Appeals held
that, because petitioner did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel,
the agents properly conducted further questioning to clarify the petitioner's
ambiguous comment about a lawyer before continuing to question him
about the offense." The United States Supreme Court affirmed and2
HELD if an accused's request for counsel is ambiguous or equivocal,'
the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him and are not required to ask questions which clarify his statement about counsel. 3
The United States Constitution guarantees to all persons the privilege
against self-incrimination. 4 In Miranda v. Arizona, 5 the Supreme Court
outlined specific procedural safeguards that police must employ before
custodial interrogation in order for statements made during interrogation to
be admissible. 6 These safeguards include the right of an accused to have
an attorney present during questioning. 7 The Miranda Court noted that
The trial
judge resolved the issue in favor of the military, accepting the version offered by the
NIS agent. Id.
5. Id. The agents did not read petitioner his rights in full or obtain another written waiver. Id.
6. Davis, 114S. Ct. at 2353.
7. Id. Petitioner also attempted to suppress additional statements made at a prior interview.
Davis, 36 M.J. at 341. The appeals court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion, finding that
petitioner was not a suspect at the time of the first interview. Id. at 340-41.
8. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2354.
12. The majority stated that unequivocal invocation "requires, at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." Id. at
2355 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).
13. Id. at 2357. The Court found no reason to question the lower court's conclusion that
petitioner's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was an ambiguous request for counsel. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment reads, "No persons ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court reviewed four unrelated cases, each challenging
the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained by the police during custodial interrogation. See
id. at 491-99. Each petitioner claimed that his confession was inadmissible because of lack of counsel
before or during the interrogation or lack of warnings concerning counsel and silence prior to the
interrogation. See id. The Court found the confessions inadmissible in all cases. Id.
16. Id. at 478-79.
17. Id. The Miranda safeguards require that prior to any questioning, a suspect must be informed
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the presence of counsel was an indispensable safeguard against compelled
self-incrimination in the inherently coercive environment of custodial
interrogations. 8 The Miranda safeguards have subsequently been interpreted by the Court to provide bright-line protection of an accused by
requiring immediate cessation of questioning once the right to counsel has
been invoked. 9 Once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, he
does not waive that right by responding to further police-initiated interrogation, even if he has been readvised of his rights.2' Additionally, once
an accused has invoked his right to counsel, his subsequent ambiguous
statements about counsel cannot be used to cast doubt on the clarity of the
initial request.2'
that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used as evidence against him, that he
has the right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him by
the court. Id. The Court further held that the defendant may waive the right to counsel after having
previously invoked it, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. at 479.
18. Id. at 469. The Court extensively quoted various police interrogation manuals as evidence of
the mentally coercive techniques used by police during the custodial interrogation process. Id. at 44955. The manuals suggest that the principle psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the person in interrogation. Id. at 449. The manuals also suggest that
the officer must interrogate "steadily and without relent," giving the accused "no respite from the
atmosphere of domination." Id. at 451. The manuals also contain suggestions on how to handle individuals who ask to speak with an attorney, including pointing out the incriminating significance of a
suspect's refusal to talk, and the great expense an attorney would create for the accused's family. Id. at
453-54.
19. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Petitioner was arrested for robbery,
burglary, and first-degree murder. Id. at 478. Once at the police station, petitioner was informed of his
Miranda rights. Id. Petitioner told police he understood his rights and was willing to answer their
questions. Id. After the police informed petitioner that another suspect implicated him in the crime,
petitioner told police he wanted to "make a deal." Id. at 478-79. Questioning ceased shortly thereafter
when petitioner said, "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id. at 479. Petitioner was then taken
to county jail. Id. The next morning two detectives attempted to question petitioner at the county jail.
Id. When petitioner told the detention officer that he did not want to talk with anyone, the officer told
petitioner" 'he had' to talk" Id. The detectives again informed him of his Mirandarights and played
a taped statement of an alleged accomplice who had implicated him. Id. Petitioner refused to allow
himself to be taped, but subsequently implicated himself in the crime. Id. The Edwards Court held that
once an accused has expressed a desire to deal with police only through counsel, the accused cannot
be subjected to any further interrogation until counsel has been made available. Id. at 484-85.
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97 (1984). The interrogation in Smith proceeded as follows:
"Q. Steve, I want to talk with you in reference to the armed robbery that took place at
McDonald's restaurant on the morning of the 19th. Are you familiar with this?
"A. Yeah. My cousin Greg was.
"Q. Okay. But before I do that I must advise you of your rights. Okay? You have a right to
remain silent. You do not have to talk to me unless you want to do so. Do you understand
that?
"A. Uh. [Chico] told me to get my lawyer. She said you guys would railroad me.
"Q. Do you understand that as I gave it to you, Steve?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. If you do want to talk to me I must advise you that whatever you say can and will be
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To apply the rules laid out by Miranda and subsequent cases interpreting Miranda, however, the police must first determine whether the accused
has invoked his right to counsel." The state and federal courts have developed three different approaches to assess whether ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel23 are sufficient to invoke an accused's Miranda
rights. These three approaches include the per se bar,24 the threshold clarity approach,' and the clarifying questions approach.'
The per se bar approach can be illustrated by People v. Superior Court
(Zolnay)' In Zolnay, police arrested two defendants in relation to a burglary." Prior to arrest, the police conducted an initial interrogation of the

used against you in court. Do you understand that?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. You have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present with you when
you're being questioned. Do you understand that?
"A. Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that."
Id. at 92-93. Instead of terminating the questioning, the interrogating officers finished reading the
Miranda rights and continued:
"Q .... If you want a lawyer and you're unable to pay for one a lawyer will be appointed
to represent you free of cost, do you understand that?
"A. Okay.
"Q. Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?
"A. Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really.
"Q. Well. You either have [to agree] to talk to me this time without a lawyer being present
and if you do agree to talk with me without a lawyer being present you can stop at any
time you want to.
"Q. All right. I'll talk to you then."
Id. Petitioner subsequently made an incriminating statement. Id. Questioning ceased when petitioner
stated, "I wanta get a lawyer." Id. at 94.
22. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 95; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
23. Compare People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1395 (Cal. 1975) (holding that any mention of counsel by the accused is sufficient to invoke the right to counsel), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976) and State v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill.
1980) (holding that an accused's statement
about counsel must meet a threshold standard of clarity before it will invoke the right to counsel) with
State v. Moulds, 673 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (holding that once an accused makes an
equivocal request for counsel, the police must cease their interrogation and confine any further questioning to clarifying the accused's comments regarding counsel). Equivocal requests for counsel can be
divided into four categories: statements that express conflicting desires to speak with or without counsel present; indecisive statements that indicate uncertainty by the suspect about the need for counsel;
actions, such as phone calls to counsel, that indicate a desire for the presence of counsel; and confusing or unclear statements. Rhonda Y. Cline, Comment, Equivocal Requests for Counsel: A Balance of
Competing Policy Considerations,55 U. CIN. L. REV. 767, 770-74.
24. See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
27. 542 P.2d 1390 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). Another illustrative case is
Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing conviction and remanding for a new trial
because improper questioning led to a confession by a murder suspect).
28. Zolnay, 542 P.2d at 1391.
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defendants in a hotel room and advised them of their Miranda rights.29
The defendants were again questioned the following day at the police station, but were not readvised of their Miranda rights." During a confrontation with both defendants in a single room, the police told the defendants that they thought the defendants were guilty. 3' One defendant responded by saying, "I guess we need a lawyer" or "Do you think we need
an attorney?" and asked the police if they could suggest one.32 The police
stated that they could not recommend an attorney, but that local attorneys
were available, and left the defendants alone with a phone directory.33
When the detectives returned, they asked if the defendants had made any
decisions." At this point, the defendants confessed to the burglary.35
The trial court granted defendants' motion to suppress the confessions, and
the State appealed.36
The California Supreme Court denied the State's request to vacate the
suppression order, finding that defendants' references to an attorney invoked their Miranda rights, and, therefore, the confessions obtained during
the subsequent questioning were inadmissible. The court held that any
mention of counsel by the accused, even if not an express invocation of
Fifth Amendment privilege, is sufficient to invoke the right to counsel.3
The Zolnay court reasoned that Miranda mandated broad invocation parameters.39 The court cited the following language from Miranda: "If...
[the defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning."' The California Supreme Court emphasized that the "in
any manner" language of Miranda dictated that an accused need not use
any specific or express form of words or conduct to invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege." The court concluded that requiring an accused to
use perfect clarity to invoke the right would subvert the prophylactic intent
of Miranda.42

29. Id.
30. Id. at 1391-92.
31. Id. at 1392.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1395. The court also denied the State's request for a writ of mandate vacating the trial
court's order suppressing the physical evidence obtained as a result of the confession. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1394 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45) (alteration in original).
41. Id. at 1395.
42. Id.
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In State v. Krueger,43 however, the Illinois Supreme Court took a
different approach to a defendant's ambiguous request for counsel. In
Krueger, the defendant was arrested and charged with stabbing a man to
death during an argument.' Prior to interrogation, the defendant was given his full Miranda warnings and signed a waiver-of-rights form. 45 When
the police began questioning him about the stabbing, defendant stated,
"Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney."' The questioning
continued, and the defendant subsequently signed a statement confessing
to the stabbing.47 The circuit court denied the defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress both the written and oral statements, and defendant was subsequently convicted at trial.'
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, finding that the
defendant did not invoke his right to counsel. 9 The Krueger court held
that an accused's statement about counsel must meet a threshold standard
of clarity in order to invoke the right to counsel. The court determined
that Miranda's"in any manner" language"' did not mean that every reference to an attorney qualified as an invocation of the right to counsel. 2
The court found it persuasive that the defendant was of normal intelligence, that he understood his Miranda rights, and that he initially agreed
to speak with the officers. 3 The court further noted that the interrogation
was brief and that there was no evidence of coercion or duress other than
that inherent in every custodial setting.54 Last, the court emphasized that
the officers' subjective belief that defendant's statement did not reflect a
desire for counsel was reasonable."
Many courts have taken yet another approach to ambiguous requests
for counsel by requiring interrogators to find out more specifically whether
an accused desires an attorney. 6 This approach was demonstrated in

43. 412 N.E.2d 537 (Il1. 1980).
44. Id. at 538.
45. Id.
46. Id. Testimony produced several alternative recollections of the defendant's statements, including: "Just a minute. That's a 20 to 40 years sentence. Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney," id., or
"Hey, you're trying to pin a murder on me. Maybe I need a lawyer." Id.
47. Id. at 539. The next morning, after telling the police that he still understood his rights, the
defendant gave the officers additional incriminating information about the crime. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 540.
50. Id.
51. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
52. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche,
776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Porter, 776
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State v. Moulds." In Moulds, the defendant was charged with theft, burglary, and robbery. 8 Prior to initiating questioning, detectives informed
the defendant of his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver form to
sign. 9 The defendant initialed each statement of rights on the form, but
did not want to initial the portion of the form which indicated his willingness to talk to the police.' A detective told the defendant he knew the
defendant was involved in a particular robbery, but refused to provide
more specific information.6" Thereafter, the defendant indicated he would
talk to the police, and initialed and signed the remainder of the waiver
form.62 The detective then began giving the defendant information about
the robbery.63 At this point, the defendant said, "Maybe I need an attorney" or "I think I need an attorney."' One of the detectives responded
by telling the defendant he had a right to an attorney, but that he had to
make the decision himself. The defendant subsequently made incriminating statements regarding several crimes.'
The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, finding
the defendant's equivocal request for an attorney was sufficient to invoke
his right to counsel.67 The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed, holding that
the defendant's statements were properly suppressed because the police
failed to ask clarifying questions about the defendant's comment regarding
counsel.68 The court held that when an accused makes an equivocal request for counsel, questioning regarding the investigation must cease, and
any further questioning must be limited to clarifying the accused's comments regarding counsel.69 The court concluded that the clarification approach provided a middle ground between giving a "ztalismanic effect" to
any mention of an attorney by an accused and insisting that an accused
invoke the right to perfect clarity.70 The court also concluded that the

F.2d 370, 370 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d
768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Riggs,
537 F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976).
57. 673 P.2d 1074 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
58. Id. at 1076.
59. Id. at 1083.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The detectives also told the defendant he could give them a written statement without

incriminating an accomplice. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

clarification approach provided the best balance between the conflicting
interests of ensuring effective law enforcement and protecting the Fifth
Amendment rights of the accused."
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court specifically refused to
provide law enforcement with a clear guideline to follow when confronted
with ambiguous requests for counsel by a criminal suspect.72 In the instant case, the Supreme Court elected to adopt the threshold of clarity
approach, holding that an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel neither invokes a suspect's right to counsel, nor does it require police to
cease interrogation or ask clarifying questions. 3 The five-member majority reasoned that requiring police to stop questioning upon any ambiguous
request for counsel, as mandated under the per-se bar approach, would
place unreasonable restrictions on police investigation by needlessly preventing police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel, even
in cases where the suspect did not in fact desire to have counsel present.74 The majority emphasized that the Miranda warnings themselves
were sufficient to protect against the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.7" The majority concluded that a rule which requires
questioning to cease only when a suspect clearly requests an attorney
would be easier for police to apply, and would not unduly hamper their
investigation.76 In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter argued that the
police should be required to ask suspects clarifying questions when they
make ambiguous references to counsel.77 According to Justice Souter,
suspects who lack verbal skills or are intimidated by the interrogation process may not be able to clearly articulate their desire for counsel. He
also expressed concern that requiring perfect clarity would make a suspect
with a genuine but equivocally phrased request believe that interrogators
were ignoring the request and that further requests would be futile.79 Finally, Justice Souter noted that the party most qualified to resolve any
ambiguity was the suspect himself, and such clarification could only be

71. Id.
72. E.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 n.3 (1987) (stating that because the Court did
not find the defendant's statements to be ambiguous or equivocal, there was no need to address the
question left open in Smith); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 (1984) (stating that the Court need not
resolve conflicting standards among courts).
73. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court held that a suspect must "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to
be a request for an attorney." Id. at 2355.
77. See id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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accomplished through direct questioning of the suspect."0
It is questionable whether the threshold of clarity approach adopted by
the instant Court is the approach that most effectively balances the competing concerns of law enforcement and an individual's Fifth Amendment
rights.8' Under the Court's approach, police will be required to make onthe-spot determinations of whether a particular ambiguous reference to
counsel meets the Court's minimum standards of clarity.82 Incorrect determinations will result in the suppression of any subsequent statements
made by the accused." Police may in good faith disregard a suspect's
legitimate request for counsel in the belief that it failed to meet the threshold standard, or raise the standard itself in a bad faith attempt to continue
an interrogation.84 In addition, courts may mandate different threshold
standards, adding to the confusion.'
The guidelines offered by the per-se bar approach,86 on the other
hand, would perhaps go too far by needlessly preventing police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel, even in cases where the
suspect did not in fact desire to have counsel present. One commentator
has suggested that this approach places the state in a paternalistic relationship with the accused, by invoking the right to counsel at any mention of
an attorney, even if the accused did not actually desire to invoke his
right.88
In contrast, the clarification approach would place the burden of deter80. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the legal analysis of whether to admit
a confession into evidence should begin with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988) ("statements governing the admissability of confessions"). Id. at 2357-58 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Commentators on the subject are critical of the balance provided by the threshold of clarity
method. See, e.g., Cline, supra note 23 at 780-81 (arguing that the primary consideration in assessing
whether a suspect has requested counsel should be the concern that causes a suspect to mention a need
for counsel, rather than the suspect's precision in expressing that concern); James J. Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1014
(1986) (recognizing that a less flexible dividing line would either overprotect or underprotect Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights); Matthew W.D. Bowman, Note, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
Interrogation:EquivocalReferences to an Attorney-Determining What Statements or Conduct Should
Constitute an Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1188 (1986)
(noting that the threshold of clarity standard may deny the protection mandated by Miranda). Interestingly, numerous bodies of law enforcement officials submitted briefs in Davis which argued against
the threshold of clarity approach, advocating instead the clarification approach. See Davis, 114 S. CL
at 2359 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring). As Justice Souter noted in a footnote, for example, the brief submitted by the United States suggested that the Court's threshold of clarity approach does not "fulfill
the fundamental purpose of Miranda." Id. at 2359 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
82. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355; Bowman, supra note 81, at 1190.
83. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
84. Id. at 2355-56; Bowman, supra note 81, at 1190.
85. See Bowman, supranote 81, at 1191.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
87. Bowman, supra note 81, at 1191.
88. Id.
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mining whether an accused has a genuine desire for counsel in the most
logical and practical place - on the accused himself.89 By requiring officers to ask narrow questions to clarify the accused's desires regarding
counsel, the State is relieved of the burdens of making paternalistic invocations or questionable judgment calls.' ° The chief danger of the approach, however, is that the police will use the clarifying questions as an
opportunity to dissuade the suspect from invoking his rights.9
The instant Court's argument that the Miranda warnings themselves
are sufficient protection disregards the practical realities of custodial interrogations.9" The inherently coercive nature of the custodial interrogation
environment is apt to confuse or intimidate those being interrogated, making it more likely that they will speak in equivocal or ambiguous terms.93
Suspects "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing
police interrogation procedures"94 are exactly those individuals whose
requests for counsel should be given wide latitude.95 In addition, the
Court's observation that "a statement either is such an assertion of the
right to counsel or it is not"96 also ignores practical realities. A substantial percentage of suspects lack sufficient command of the English lan7
guage, 9 and
many of them are "woefully ignorant."98 Such suspects

89. Ada Clapp, The Second Circuit Adopts a ClarificationApproach to Ambiguous Requests for
Counsel: United States v. Gotay, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 511, 513 (1990).
No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to proceed... on his own terms and as
if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to
say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak
through an attorney or not at all.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 99 (1994) (citing Illinois v. Smith, 466 N.E.2d 236, 241 (I11.
1984)
(Simon, J., dissenting)).
90. See Bowman, supra note 81, at 1191.
91. See Clapp,' supra note 89, at 534.
92. Studies suggest that many of those interrogated do not fully understand the Miranda warnings. See, e.g., THOMAS GRisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTs 98-103 (1981) (finding that 60-70%
of juveniles and 30-40% of adults do not fully comprehend the warnings); Richard J. Medalie etal.,
Custodial Police Interrogationin Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH.
L. REV. 1347, 1374 (1968) (concluding that 15-24% of those interrogated did not fully understand the
warnings).
93. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing W. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC
EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE COuRTROOM 61-72 (1982)).

94. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
95. In the instant case, petitioner had been detained at the military base for the two weeks immediately prior to his interrogation. Davis, 36 MJ.at 243.
96. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984)).
97. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468).
98. Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring). The Davis majority itself recognized this weakness in
their approach. "We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other
reasons-will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer
present." Id. at 2356.
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should not be required to express their desire for counsel with "lawyer-like
precision ' '99 in order to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights.
The Court's approach to ambiguous references to counsel appears to
continue its trend of decisions which narrow the scope of Miranda safeguards." The spirit of Miranda, to honor the suspect's choice of the
presence or absence of counsel,1"' would be better preserved by a rule
which requires interrogators to verify, through narrowly confined questions, whether a suspect under custodial interrogation who makes an ambiguous statement regarding counsel is expressing a desire to have counsel
present. Requiring the police to ask questions to clarify an ambiguous
request for counsel would effectuate the protections intended by Miranda
without unduly hampering law enforcement. The standard chosen by the
Court diminishes Miranda and casts additional shadows in an already
murky area.

99. United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1988).
100. See generally Clapp, supranote 91 (finding the Court has limited Mirandaprotections in the
exclusionary rule's application to Mirandaviolations, adherence to Mirandarequirements in the interrogation setting, and compliance with Miranda in the contexts of waiver and invocation of counsel).
101. See Clapp, supra note 89, at 544.
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